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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2017, Dan Donovan, a Republican House member 
representing New York’s 11th congressional district, introduced the 
Curbing Realistic Exploitative Electronic Pedophilic Robots (CREEPER) 
Act to ban the importation and distribution of childlike sex dolls and 
robots.1 The legislation has bipartisan support among its twelve 
cosponsors,2 while a Change.org petition urging support has garnered 
164,000 signatures as of March 2018.3 The introduction of the CREEPER 
Act has coincided with a discussion in several popular venues—including 
The Atlantic and NBCNews.com4—of a mitigated defense of child sex 
bots (CSBs) by philosopher Marc Behrendt.5 CSBs, Behrendt argues, 
could be used therapeutically by pedophiles to help keep them from taking 
action against real children.6 In that case, an unrestricted ban on CSBs 
could be counterproductive and potentially undermine the safety of 
children. 
My questions are what to make of this defense of CSBs and how to 
make sense of the moral intuitions we have about the case. For example, I 
think we have a stronger unreflective gut reaction of abhorrence to the 
nontherapeutic use of CSBs than we do to the therapeutic use—in the latter 
                                                     
 1. See CREEPER Act of 2017, H.R. 4655, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 
115th-congress/house-bill/4655 [https://perma.cc/8NPY-XCET]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Stop Abuse Campaign, Ban Child Sex Dolls, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/ban-
child-sex-dolls-that-encourage-child-sex-abuse-banchildsexdolls [https://perma.cc/ZR9C-R55M]. 
 4. David Cox, Would Child Sex Robots Stop Pedophilia—Or Promote It?, NBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 
2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/would-child-sex-robots-stop-pedophilia-or-promote-
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 5. Behrendt’s views were expressed at the Love and Sex Robots Conference held in London in 
December 2017. For his extended defense of the position, see Marc Behrendt, Reflections on Moral 
Challenges Posed by a Therapeutic Childlike Sexbot, in LOVE AND SEX WITH ROBOTS 96, 96–113 
(Adrian D. Cheok & David Levy eds., 2017). 
 6. Id. 
1154 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:1153 
case, it seems our reaction (at least my reaction) is more ambivalent. 
Perhaps our reflective moral judgments will reject these initial intuitions, 
but I want to clarify what these intuitions seem to be tracking—just to help 
us think through things. I will begin by briefly reviewing background 
information on pedophilia to set up our moral discussion. I will then 
explore our moral intuitions about CSBs through the lenses of three 
different moral philosophies: utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. 
As the title of the paper suggests, I think the virtue ethics perspective 
captures something here that the alternative moral views do not. 
I. BACKGROUND ON PEDOPHILIA 
Pedophilic disorder is defined by the DSM-5 in terms of sexual urges 
toward prepubescent children that have either been acted upon or that have 
caused distress or interpersonal difficulty.7 There are various criticisms of 
the definition, with some thinking it is too broad and some thinking it is 
too narrow, but I will pass over such complications here.8 The point to 
focus on is that the definition keeps distinct the desire or urge to act and 
any actual instance of child molestation or child-directed sexual behavior.9 
The definition allows that some pedophiles might never assault children 
or act in any other morally objectionable way toward them—they never 
act on their desire.10 And the definition allows that some people who do 
molest children may not qualify as pedophiles because, for example, they 
are generally sexually attracted to adults.11 
There is no known cure for the condition and no known treatment for 
which there is solid evidence that the treatment is highly effective.12 
Cognitive behavioral therapy (e.g., therapy involving relapse prevention 
behavior) shows mixed results; if anything, the higher-powered studies 
seem to suggest such therapy is not especially promising.13 Various forms 
of pharmacological treatments seem to be ineffective when used alone and 
show only mixed results when combined with other things (including 
                                                     
 7. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
698 (5th ed. 2013). 
 8. For a critical discussion, see Fred S. Berlin, Pedophilia and DSM-5: The Importance of 
Clearly Defining the Nature of a Pedophilic Disorder, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 404, 404–
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 9. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 7, at 697. 
 10. See id. at 698. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See MICHAEL C. SETO, PEDOPHILIA AND SEXUAL OFFENDING AGAINST CHILDREN: THEORY, 
ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION 190–91 (2008). 
 13. See id. at 170–75. 
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cognitive behavioral therapy).14 Such drugs have also been found to have 
unwanted side effects: liver disease, weight gain, anxiety, and more.15 
The point is that we are not operating against a baseline in which 
there are known, effective ways of treating the condition of pedophilia; it 
is not as though treatment is presently a success. Rather, researchers 
should be looking to explore new options given that nothing else seems to 
be working especially well. So, the possibility of using CSBs 
therapeutically should not simply be dismissed out of hand. Even if there 
are some skeptics inclined to be dismissive, we might still think it is worth 
trying out with small studies because any known form of treating 
pedophilia has similar skeptics. 
II. OUR FIRST TWO MORAL THEORIES TO CONSIDER 
I now want to examine CSBs from the perspectives of two of the 
leading moral theories in the history of Western philosophy: utilitarianism 
and Kantianism. First, utilitarianism says that we should act so as to 
maximize pleasure and minimize pain.16 Applied to our present case, 
utilitarianism finds nothing directly wrong with the use of CSBs, whether 
it is done therapeutically or not. As artificial intelligence and our 
understanding of consciousness advance, perhaps one day we will be able 
to build robots that feel pain and pleasure, including sex robots. And at 
that point, we will have moral obligations to treat those robots well—it 
would be rank human chauvinism to hold otherwise. But we are nowhere 
near this point yet. The CSBs of today and the near future have no capacity 
for consciousness—no one in the debate claims otherwise—and so no 
matter what is done to them, it is not morally bad by utilitarian lights. 
Now, there is room to worry that the use of CSBs could encourage 
people to go out and harm actual children. In that way, there could be 
something indirectly wrong with the use of CSBs. This is the view of some 
critics of even the therapeutic use of CSBs: it would be wrong for the 
government to allow such use not because of anything involving the robot 
itself but because of what it is likely to lead to regarding the subsequent 
harm of actual children.17 I have two points of response to this line of 
argument. 
First, to repeat, the status quo is that we presently have very little 
evidence about what either promotes or discourages pedophiles to act 
                                                     
 14. See id. at 177–81. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (1907); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861). 
 17. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4. 
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toward children,18 and so just as we cannot say with confidence that the 
use of CSBs will reduce harm directed at actual children, we also cannot 
say with any confidence that it will lead to greater harm. Given this state 
of ignorance, a plausible case exists for at least trying out small studies 
involving a limited number of individuals to see the results. If the results 
show a decrease in sexual behavior directed toward actual children, 
great—a success, and now we can try to spread this treatment to others. If 
the results show an increase in objectionable behavior, shut the CSB 
program down. But, given that there is no known cure for pedophilia, this 
is arguably all that Behrendt’s argument needs to establish the conclusion 
that we should pursue—at least for now—the therapeutic use of CSBs.19 
Second, this line of argument about the potential harm to actual 
children does not capture our intuition that there is something morally 
wrong or at least creepy (the title of the legislation is the “CREEPER Act,” 
after all) about the use of CSBs. I want to try to capture what that intuition 
is about, regardless of whether we ultimately accept or reject it. To make 
my case that this is not what the intuition of creepiness is tracking, imagine 
that your friend and neighbor passes away, and as you are going through 
his house to settle his affairs, you find multiple CSBs that he had been 
using. Many people would still have the intuition of creepiness—the gut 
reaction of a moral judgment against the neighbor—even though by 
stipulation he has passed away and so there is no chance of him going on 
to harm actual children. To be clear, the worry that the use of CSBs will 
contribute to the harm of actual children should be taken seriously. But the 
present point is that this issue alone does not seem to exhaust our intuitive 
moral concern about the case. 
Let us move on to the second moral theory to consider: Kantianism.20 
The core of Kantianism is the categorical imperative, whose second 
formulation states that we should act in such a way as to never treat rational 
beings merely as a means but always at the same time as an end.21 In short, 
do not use people (or rational beings more generally) as if they were 
objects. 
As with utilitarianism, Kantianism seems to find nothing immoral in 
the use of CSBs, whether therapeutic or not. We may one day develop sex 
robots that qualify as rational beings. If we do, our mistreatment of them 
will qualify as immoral by Kantian standards. But the CSBs we have now 
are mere objects, not rational beings, so there is nothing wrong with 
                                                     
 18. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 7, at 699–700. 
 19. See Behrendt, supra note 5, at 96–113. 
 20. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary 
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785). 
 21. Id. at 66. 
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treating them as mere objects, nothing wrong with treating them however 
we like—or so says the Kantian. And so, as with utilitarianism, 
Kantianism seems incapable of capturing the intuition that there is a moral 
difference between the two cases.22 
III. MORAL DUMBFOUNDING 
I pause here to describe the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding, 
which may be familiar to some of you from the moral psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt’s work, popularized in his book The Righteous Mind.23 The 
idea is that you present people with scenarios you describe to them, and 
people have strong moral intuitions—“this is wrong!”—but then when you 
ask them to justify their position, they are unable to. They try this or that 
argument only to quickly realize or have it pointed out to them that it does 
not work. People might still stick with the intuition—“this is wrong, even 
if I can’t say why!”—but they are dumbfounded to explain it. I will give 
two quick examples to illustrate. 
First, imagine a sister and brother, Julie and Mark. While on 
vacation, they decide they want to have sex. They use multiple forms of 
birth control, so there is no risk on that front. Afterwards, they decide that 
they enjoyed the experience, but they also decide not to do it again. Going 
forward, the event does not harm their relationship at all. Presenting this 
sort of scenario to ordinary subjects, Haidt found that many subjects had 
the strong intuition that Julie and Mark had done something wrong, but 
they were unable to formulate sufficient reasons to justify this judgment.24 
For example, such subjects might say the act of incest was wrong because 
of the chance of having a child with birth defects. But then they are 
reminded that Julie and Mark used birth control, and at any rate, the act 
did not lead to the conception of a child. At that point, subjects would look 
to another reason to justify their judgment, but the result would often be 
the same—on reflection, that other reason did not work out either. Many 
subjects were left with the strong moral judgment even after giving up on 
looking for reasons to justify it. They were morally dumbfounded. 
Cases of moral dumbfounding need not involve sex—it is not just 
tracking a phenomenon having to do with sexual morality. To adapt an 
                                                     
 22. Kant did condemn masturbation and in fact regarded it as a worse moral offense than suicide 
in some ways. So, one could argue that the use of CSBs is wrong not because of what users do to the 
bot but rather because of what users do to themselves—they debase themselves. But Kant’s objection 
counts against masturbation in general, not just the use of CSBs, and few of us today would agree with 
such a sweeping moral view or want to base legislation on it. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE (1797). 
 23. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS 
AND RELIGION (2013). 
 24. Id. at 45–47. 
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example from Haidt, imagine a family who has a beloved dog as a pet, a 
dog they regard as in effect a family member.25 One day, tragically, the 
dog is struck by a car and killed. The family quickly decides that it would 
be a waste of perfectly good meat to dispose of the animal, so they decide 
to eat their now-deceased dog. Again, when the details of the story are 
filled out in the right way (so, for instance, it is no part of the family’s 
culture or religious beliefs to eat dogs or to eat pets), many will find 
themselves having the intuitive reaction that a family deciding so quickly 
to eat their beloved dog is in the wrong, even if we have trouble 
articulating why. 
Linking these two examples to our previous discussion, you will 
notice that neither the Julie and Mark case nor the family dog case are 
judged to be immoral from either the utilitarian or Kantian perspectives. 
No pain is caused in either case (the family did not strike the dog with the 
car, and so they are not the ones causing any pain there), and no rational 
being is used merely as a means to an end. Deepening the connection to 
the previous discussion, perhaps this is the way to think of CSBs—in terms 
of moral dumbfounding. We have a strong moral intuition that there is 
something creepy or objectionable about the use of CSBs but struggle to 
articulate why this is. We are dumbfounded. 
IV. VIRTUE ETHICS 
Returning from our digression, let us now discuss the third and final 
moral theory I want to consider, virtue ethics, along the lines developed 
by Aristotle.26 A key point of difference between virtue ethics and both 
utilitarianism and Kantianism is that virtue ethics takes as its primary 
object of focus persons rather than actions. The first question of virtue 
ethics is not “is this action right or wrong?” Rather, it is “is this person 
good or bad—do they have a good or bad character?” This judgment of 
character looks at a person’s character traits, which are understood as 
dispositions or tendencies to behave in certain ways. Certain traits qualify 
as virtues while others qualify as vices. 
From the virtue ethics framework, individual actions may give us 
evidence of a person’s character, evidence of what dispositions to behavior 
that person has. But individual actions do not by themselves determine 
character. There is reason to think this helps shed light on the phenomenon 
of moral dumbfounding. Consider the poor, beloved, but ultimately eaten 
family dog. Maybe there is nothing directly wrong with eating your 
deceased pet. Again, doing so causes no pain and treats no rational being 
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 26. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2000). 
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as a mere means to an end. But, we might think, it reveals something 
objectionable about your character. For example, it shows you to be 
callous if you eat loved ones too quickly with too easy a conscience. 
Maybe this is what moral dumbfounding tracks generally: moral 
judgments not of actions but of underlying character traits. 
Whether or not we want to stake out this general view on moral 
dumbfounding, the virtue ethics perspective does seem to help us make 
sense of our attitude about the different uses of CSBs. Consider the person 
who buys a CSB on a black market and uses it recreationally with no 
therapeutic benefit intended. We might think, alright, this action is not by 
itself bad—no pain is caused, and no rational being is used as a means to 
an end. But it reveals something disturbing about the person’s underlying 
character, about their general dispositions to behave. A person who does 
this—might they not have a general disposition for sexual behavior 
directed at children, a disposition that might manifest itself in other 
circumstances where actual children are involved? At least that is the 
thought that I am suggesting our intuition seems to be grasping at. Now, 
within a broadly Aristotelian framework, there is an interesting question 
of whether such a disposition should count as a vice or instead as a 
misfortune, where vices are understood as character traits we can exercise 
rational control over while misfortunes we cannot. This distinction 
plausibly connects to the question of blame: we can blame people for their 
vices but not for their misfortunes, and so determining how to categorize 
pedophiles’ disposition for sexual behavior directed at children bears on 
whether we should blame them for the disposition itself (i.e., even aside 
from whether it is acted upon) or should instead regard the disposition as 
an unfortunate circumstance outside of pedophiles’ control (as we view 
people’s bad health). I will leave this question open here. Either way, the 
point is that it is a non-ideal state to be in. 
Next, consider the diagnosed pedophile who wants to avoid acting 
on their urges toward children, who seeks therapy, and who opts to use a 
CSB as part of that therapy. This bit of behavior seems to reflect a different 
underlying disposition than the previous case. Here, we might think the 
underlying disposition is actually a disposition to protect others or, perhaps 
more specifically, a disposition to protect children from oneself. And this 
is a good disposition to have—it is a virtue. 
Or maybe we want to view this therapeutic case with some 
ambivalence. To capture this ambivalence, we might say there is a single 
bit of behavior, namely sexual activity directed toward a CSB, and this 
single bit of behavior actually counts as the manifestation of two distinct 
dispositions: one, a negative disposition to act sexually toward children 
(which, again, we might count as either a vice or a misfortune), and two, 
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a positive disposition to protect others from oneself (a virtue). Insofar as 
we pause over the case or are intuitively of mixed minds about it, perhaps 
this dual dispositional manifestation is why. At any rate, this still reflects 
an intuitive difference between the therapeutic and nontherapeutic uses of 
CSBs, where such ambivalence is lacking, or at least not as acutely felt. 
Taking stock, insofar as there seems to be an intuitive moral 
difference between the therapeutic and nontherapeutic uses of CSBs, this 
intuitive difference is not captured by either the utilitarian or the Kantian 
frameworks, which treat the two cases as equal. But it seems like there is 
a promising way to capture the intuitive moral difference within the virtue 
ethics perspective. This, I suggest, is what our moral intuitions are 
tracking: our gut reactions to the behavioral dispositions, and so moral 
characters of, the different actors in the different scenarios. 
CONCLUSION 
Now, I have been focusing on our initial moral intuitions, our gut 
reactions. It is important to keep these distinct from our final overall moral 
judgments. You might have the initial gut reaction that something is 
morally wrong but decide after further reflection that your initial intuition 
is mistaken—that everything is morally on the up and up. Going further, 
you might think our moral intuitions, in general, do not count for much. 
Some people have gut reactions that there is something wrong or even 
abhorrent about interracial couples or gay adoption or stay-at-home dads, 
but upon reflection, many of us simply reject those intuitions rather than 
treat them as reflecting a profound “wisdom of repugnance,” in Leon 
Kass’s famous phrase.27 
I do not want to try to settle the question of the epistemic value of 
moral intuitions here. Instead, I want to conclude by connecting the 
preceding thoughts to the law. That is, even if we do ultimately embrace 
the virtue-theoretic argument that the therapeutic use of CSBs is morally 
superior to the nontherapeutic use, is that something we think the law 
should act on? For example, should the CREEPER Act carve out an 
exception for the therapeutic use of CSBs, prohibiting their use except 
under the guidance of a counselor? 
More generally, do we think it is appropriate to legislate virtue, 
specifically in those cases where virtue and protection from harm come 
apart in the sense that the (purportedly) unvirtuous behavior causes no pain 
and uses no rational being as a mere means to an end? This goes against 
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familiar liberal conceptions of the point of the law, although this by itself 
is not a reductio ad absurdum—maybe liberal conceptions need to be 
rethought. At any rate, I am out of time and so will take no stance on the 
question here. I leave it as a topic of further debate. 
 
